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decision in T. MoAvity & Sons v. Can. Bank of Commerce2 O that "if
the chartered banks are to continue the normal financing of the oper-
ations of contractors, then a speedy repeal of section 3 appears to be
indicated",21 was unduly apprehensive. The courts are aware that
there are conflicting interests between two relatively innocent part-
ies and that the legislature has decided in its wisdom to protect the
interests of the party who has the least opportunity of protecting
himself. The chartered banks are surely in a better position to ascer-
tain the present and future financial position of a contractor than is
a workman. Hence, while the banks may be more cautious in the
future in dealing with builders, it is improbable that they will refuse
to grant credit to members of a basic industry merely on the ground
that in some cases they may not have unimpeachable securities.
22
MERVIN BURGARDO
LA PIERRE V. WALTER-RECOGNrION OF FOREIGN DIVORCE DECRE,-
PREFERENCE FOR RESTRICTIVE VIEW OF SHAW V. GOULD- LIBERAL
APPROACH OF TRAVERS V. HOLLEY. The important conflict of laws
problem of the recognition of foreign decrees of divorce arose again
in the interesting case of La Pierre v. Walter,1 heard recently in the
Supreme Court of Alberta. There, Riley J. considered the problem
fully; then he rejected emphatically the rule in Travers v. Holley2
and adopted what appeared to him to be the orthodox approach as
declared in Shaw v. Gould3 and affirmed in Le Mesurier v. Le Mesu-
rier.4 This comment is confined to brief discussion of the learned
judge's approach to the problem and the possible relevance his decision
may bear for an Ontario court.
The basic common law position was clearly laid down in Shaw v.
Gould, where the House of Lords held that the English courts would
recognize a foreign decree of divorce only if the parties were domi-
ciled in the foreign country at the time of the divorce proceedings.
The Privy Council in Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier reiterated the rule.
Lord Watson put it this way:
"A decree of divorce a vincuio, pronounced by a Court whose jurisdic.
tion is solely derived from some rule of municipal law peculiar to Its
forum, cannot, when it trenches upon the interests of any other country
to whose tribunals the spouses were amenable, claim extra-territorial
authority".5
This same rule also applied at common law in relation to the
assumption of jurisdiction in matters of divorce. Strictly speaking,
20 [1959] S.C.R. 478; (1959), 14 D.L.R. (2d) 153; (1959), 37 Can. Bcy. R.
1; affirming [1958] O.W.N. 324.
21 (1959), 37 Can. Bcy. R. 1 at 5.
22The author has not examined the economic problems created by sec.
tion 3, viz. the effect on the number of advances to contractors generally, to
the classes of contractors or the effect of a possible interest rate increase.
*Mr. Burgard is in the Third Year at Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 (1960), 31 W.W.R. 26; 24 D.L.R. (2d) 483.
2 [1953] P. 246; [1953] 2 All E.R. 794 (C.A.).
3 (1868), L.R. 3 H.L. 55.
4 [1895] A.C. 517. (P.C.).
5 Ibid at p. 528.
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the English courts would only entertain divorce proceedings if the
parties' domicile (the husband's) was English at the time of the in-
stitution of those proceedings. In recent times, however, the legis-
lators of both the United Kingdom and Canada have seen fit to ex-
tend the jurisdiction of the local forums to enable them to grant
divorces under certain circumstances, even though the husband is
not domiciled there at the time of the institution of the action.6 There
is comparable legislation in other parts of the Commonwealth and in
the United States.
The enactment of such legislation raises many new and difficult
problems for the courts. Should they adhere to the strict domicile rule
in relation to the recognition of foreign divorces when they them-
selves assume jurisdiction in matters of divorce in certain non-domi-
cile situations? The much-discussed case of Travers v. Ho~ley7 offers
a solution to this somewhat complex problem. In that case the Court
of Appeal held that the English courts should recognize a divorce de-
cree of a non-domicile court, if the foreign court had exercised a
jurisdiction comparable to that which the English courts themselves
exercised by statute. Lord Somervell said this:
"On principle it seems to me plain that our courts in this matter should
recognize a jurisdiction which they themselves claim. I did not myself
really understand on what grounds it was submitted that the result
should be otherwise". 8
This case has been followed and approved in a series of English
decisions since 1953.9 Yet Travers v. Holley is not without its critics,1 0
in fact, in both Warden v. Wardenl and Fenton v. Fenton'2 Scottish
and Australian courts, respectively, have unequivocally rejected the
principle laid down in that case and found the strict common law
rule in recognition matters preferable. This criticism is of import-
ance since Riley J. in the case under discussion clearly followed those
decisions.
In La Pierre v. Walter, the court had to decide whether to recog-
nize a Scottish divorce, even though the husband was never at any
time domiciled in Scotland. The Court of Session in Scotland had jur-
isdiction because of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act
194913 extended the jurisdiction of the Scottish courts in cases where
6 Divorce Jurisdiction Act, 1930, 20-21 Geo. V, c. 15, s. 2, (Now R.S.C.
1952, c. 84) in Canada, and Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950, 14 Geo. VI, c. 25,
s. 18 in England.
7 See supra footnote 2.8 Ibid. at p. 251.
9 See the following cases as examples: Carr v. Carr, [1955] 2 All E.R. 61;
[1955] 1 W.W.R. 422, (P.D.A.); Arnold v. Arnold, [1957] P. 237; [1957] 1 All
E.R. 570 (P.D.A.); Manning v. Manning, [19581 P. 112; [1958] 1 All E.R. 291(P.D.A.).3o See for example: R. R. Blackburn in (1954), 17 Mod. Law Rev. pp.
471-3; J. S. Ziegel in (1953), 31 Can. Bar Rev. pp. 1077-9; F. A. Mann in (1954),
17 Mod. Law Rev. pp. 79-81.1 1 Warden v. Warden, [1951] Sess. C. 508; [1951] Scot. L.T. 406.12 Fenton v. Fenton, [1957] V.L.R. 17 which was referred to but not
followed in Manning v. Manning, supra, footnote 9.13 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. VI,
c. 100, s. 2.
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the wife was ordinarily resident in Scotland for three years prior to
the institution of the divorce proceedings notwithstanding that her
husband was not domiciled in Scotland at that time. Riley J., con-
sidered Travers v. Holley,14 decided it should not be followed in
Alberta, and held that the reasoning in Warden v. Warden and Fen-
ton v. Fenton was to be preferred.
Lord Strachan in the former case reasoned this way: when the
legislature extends the jurisdiction of the courts in the matter of
granting divorces, it does not necessarily follow that the rules of
recognition of foreign divorce decrees are similarly extended. His
Lordship pointed out that the Matrimonial Causes (War Marriages)
Act, 194415 expressly provided for the extension of circumstances in
which foreign divorces would be recognized. The statute in question
did not so provide. In summary Lord Strachan said:
"The real point is, however, that in sharp contrast to that earlier Act,
the Act of 1949 made no provision for the recognition of the decrees of
other courts. In my opinion, the necessary inference is that Parliament
in 1949 did not intend to innovate at all upon that matter, and It seems
to me that there is no warrant for me to depart from the previousjudicial precedents which recognized in divorce only the decrees of thehusband's domicile or decrees recognized by those courts".16
In the Fenton case, the Victoria Full Court followed Warden V.
Warden; O'Bryan J. criticised Travers v. Holley in this way:
"The position therefore, is that I find a decision of the House of Lords,
viz., Shaw v. Gould ... which states in the plainest language that domi-
cile is the basis of recognition of foreign decrees in divorce because
divorce is a matter of status ... In Travers v. Holley the learned LordJustices appear to have regarded Le Mesurier's as the only case which
stood in the way of recognition of the New South Wales decree. That
case was not concerned with the recognition of a foreign decree at all
* . . Their Lordships made no reference to the important decision of
Bhaw v. Gould, where the recognition of foreign decrees directly arose
•.. With the greatest respect to the learned Lord Justices I do not find
the reasoning in Travers v. Holley convincing and in my opinion It Is
contrary to higher authority and should not be followed by this court".1
Travers v. Holley might be criticised on another point not con-
sidered by his Lordship in La Pierre v. Walter. It is a rule of statu-
tory interpretation that a statute is presumed to displace the common
law only within the narrow limits of the words used by the legisla-
ture. The statute in question in Travers v. Holley did not deal with
the recognition of foreign divorces; therefore, the court was wrong
in using the statute as a basis for so extending the common law.
The real issue is, however, should his Lordship have considered
Trauors v. Holley at all? On the facts it seems apparent that the rule
would not have been applicable anyway. There is no legislation in
Canada extending jurisdiction to situations whereby a wife may bring
divorce proceedings if she has been resident in Canada for a stipu-
lated period of time and even though her husband is no longer domi-
14 Supra footnote 2.15 Supra footnote 13, sec. 1.
16 1951, S.C. 508 at 511. [1951] Sess. C. 508 at 511.
17 Supra footnote 12 at p. 33.
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ciled in Canada. Nor would the Divorce Jurisdiction Act have been
applicable in the Travers sense, for at no time was the husband domi-
ciled in Scotland and that Act requires a domicile in a Canadian
province before the desertion. Thus his Lordship could have achieved
what in his opinion was a just solution on the facts in very simple
fashion. The foreign court was not the court of the domicile; Travers
v. Holley was not applicable; therefore the divorce in question should
not be recognized in Alberta.
There can be little quarrel with his Lordship's reasons for judg-
ment. From a strictly stare decisis point of view he was quite correct
in refusing to adopt Travers v. Holey in favour of the more orthodox
approach in Warden v. Warden's and Fenton v. Fenton.'9 Naturally
he was not bound by an English Court of Appeal decision. However
it is respectfully suggested that his Lordship should not have rejected
what appears to be a desirable advance in the law-especially when
that rejection was not necessary in order to reach his decision.
One of the aims of our courts in this area should be to eliminate,
wherever possible, so-called 'limping' marriages. There is nothing
more socially disruptive than to have persons married in one juris-
diction and single in another; or children who are legitimate in onejurisdiction and illegitimate in another. No one would suggest that
every foreign divorce be recognized by our courts. Yet where our
courts are exercising divorce jurisdiction in more and more non-
domicile situations, is it not reasonable that they should in turn
recognize foreign decrees of non-domicile courts? For if the courts
in the common law jurisdictions of the world continue to grant di-
vorces in non-domicile situations (and there is no reason why they
will not) and if they refuse to recognize such divorces (as Riley J.
seems to intend) then the number of 'limping' marriages must of
necessity increase. And this, it is submitted, is a most unsatisfactory
social situation-one which Travers v. Holey solves, at least partially.
There are no cases in Ontario dealing with a Travers v. Holley
problem; though there are two other Canadian cases that refer to the
Travers rule, one with approval.20 When the question does come be-
fore the Ontario courts it is to be hoped that our courts will follow the
principles of Travers v. Holley.
MILTON J. LEWIS*
28 Supra footnote 11.
19 Bupra footnote 12.20 See Yeger and Duder v. Reg. General (1958), 26 W.W.R. 651, where
the court discussed Travers v. Holley with approval but found it inapplicable
in the particular fact situation.
In Bednar and Bednar v. Dep. Reg. GeneraZ (1960), 31 W.W.R. 40; 24
D.L.R. (2d) 238, the court used Travers v. Holley as one ground of its deci-
sion although not discussing the principle at any length. Milvain J. stated
in the first paragraph of his judgment that, "As some interest has been indi-
cated, I have decided to write my reasons for granting the order". The inter-
est no doubt arose due to the fact that his brother judge in the La Pierre
decision had come to the opposite conclusion some eleven days beforehand.
Milvain J. had the benefit of counsel appearing in both sides whereas the La
Pierre action was undefended.
*Mr. Lewis is in the Third Year at Osgoode Hall Law School.
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